IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1971

No._____

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, *Respondent,*

v.

RAY F. WILSON and RUBY J. WILSON, *Petitioners.*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
To The United States Court of Appeals
For The Fifth Circuit

Petitioners, Ray F. Wilson and Ruby J. Wilson, pray that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, entered in the above entitled case on March 30, 1971.

Citations To Opinions Below

The memorandum opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas is unreported. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit is reported in 440 F.2d 1103 and a copy appears in the appendix (Appendix, p. 11).

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals was entered on March 30, 1971 (Appendix, p. 11). Rehearing was denied April 22, 1971 (Appendix, p. 15). The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. Section 1224(1).

Questions Presented

1. Whether petitioners had a right to a Miranda Warning under the peculiar circumstances where said investigation was ab initio criminal, was carried out by criminal investigators, and in the light of the fact that petitioners ask the special agents whether or not they should employ counsel.

2. Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, was correct in dismissing the appeal as to Ray F. Wilson, and if so, did such dismissal deny petitioner, Ray F. Wilson the right to have his case decided based on the applicable law and the peculiar facts that gave rise to said case.

3. Whether petitioners were denied a substantial right to a jury trial when the Government was allowed on appeal to use untimely extra record evidence in procuring an affirmation of the trial Court's judgment.

4. Whether petitioners were subject to substantial restraint when the Government's special agents place petitioners in the absence of any warning in a darkened, essential enclosed room in the Federal Building at 515 Rusk Avenue, Houston, Texas, and interrogated and cross-examined petitioners under essentially jail house like conditions.

5. Whether equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution may be denied a taxpayer for no reason other than that their residence is outside rather than within a certain judicial district.

6. Whether the Government has a right to refuse to reveal the identity of an informant where probable cause for initiating said criminal investigation depends upon such identity, where the Government fails to assert any privilege, and where the Special Agents gives conflicting testimony concerning the informant.

7. Whether after jeopardy attaches the Government may use the Judicial Process as an instrumentality to accomplish a double indictment and double prosecution on the same and expanded Counts arising out of the same facts.

8. Whether under the instant facts of this case petitioner, Ray F. Wilson, has a right to represent himself as a sole Pro Se Attorney, and, if so, did the trial court commit error by forcing said petitioner to employ counsel for the benefit of the Government, notwithstanding the fact that petitioner acted in good faith and with rare ability.

9. Whether the Governments continued delay gives the taxpayers protection under "IRS New Release No. 897, October 3, 1971", reprinted in 7 CCH 1967 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. Section 6832 and a further right to permanent dismissal of said case.

10. Whether petitioners have a right to a jury fairly selected.

Statutes Involved

The statutory provisions involved are 28 U.S.C. Section 1654; Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 32, 28 U.S.C. Section 1224(1).

Statement

Petitioners, Ray F. Wilson and wife, Ruby J. Wilson were indicted jointly, prosecued and convicted for income tax evasion and not reporting income allegedly received for the taxable years 1962, 1963, and 1964, in violation of Sections 7201 and 7206(1) of Title 26 of the United States IR Code. Prior to this six count indictment, Petitioner Ray F. Wilson was indicted on three identical counts for income tax evasion and Petitioner was prosecuted simultaneously in two separate suits at the same time until the two suits were merged, notwithstanding, the fact that said petitioner had pleaded not guilty in both suits. On taxpayer's motion for the suppression of evidence obtained from him by Special Internal Revenue Agents and such other evidence a derivative thereof in violation of defendants constitutional rights, the trial court denied suppression in the absence of a single government agent taking the stand to testify.

During the years of 1965 and 1966, on seven separate occasions petitioners were questioned by one or more of the Special Agents concerning petitioners tax liability. Although the investigation was criminal from its inception and coupled with the fact that petitioners inquired of its nature and the need for employing an attorney, the criminal and the Special Agents concealed the true nature and purpose of the investigation until the investigation was essentially completed and it was too late for petitioners to employ the assistance of effective counsel to protect their constitutional rights.

The facts of the case indicate that petitioner and his wife were requested to come to the Internal Revenue Office in the federal building at Houston, Texas, for the purpose of closing out the case according to the petitioners' understanding, a group of Special Agents placed petitioners in an essentially enclosed dreary space and carried out a long and detailed interrogation and cross examination of petitioners. The uncontradicted facts of the case show that Special Agent Pickett criticized Special Agent Crocker for misleading petitioners and concealing (Transcript pp. 170, 183, 184, 185, 256, 261, 262, 768, 769, 776, 781, 782, and 784) the nature and originality of the investigation.

Petitioner, Ray F. Wilson, in an attempt to get a speedy trial of his case represented himself as Pro Se Attorney in said case. The government through delay and pressure obtained an oral order from the court that petitioner could not represent himself since he was not a licensed attorney. After being forced to employ counsel, petitioner, Ray F. Wilson employed attorney Roberson L. King. Meanwhile, the government procured a joint indictment against petitioner and his wife based on the same cause of action.

Upon requesting a jury trial, the jurors were qualified and excluded based upon the grade level obtained in school coupled with the condition that casual inquiries had been made upon them by the Internal Revenue Service (Transcript pp. 325-363). This selection and qualification process inherently and systematically excluded all black jurors from the panel to the extent that the trial court judge had to add an additional juror to the reduced panel in obtaining a jury of twelve. The trial judge specifically selected Mrs. David Dewitt (white), Transcript, pp. 357 and 362 who falls in the same classification of persons who had been excluded from the panel.

After being convicted in a jury trial, petitioners gave proper notice of appeal of their case, which included notice and acceptance in open court followed by proper written notice. Petitioner, Ray F. Wilson, submitted his Pro Se motion to file a Pro Se motion in said case which was granted. Meanwhile after many months had passed and the time for filing appellee's motion to the Fifth Circuit had presumably passed, the government procured a "Memorandum and Order" in which finding of facts were presumably made ex parte and outside the record. Moreover, the government extended the record of the case by filing a late brief which included said findings of fact. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal after considering the government's motion for dismissal and the aforementioned finding of fact held that Ray F. Wilson had not received the final judgment entitling him to appellate review. The trial court's judgment as to Ruby Wilson was affirmed and the appeal of Ray F. Wilson was dismissed and remanded back to the District Court for resentencing on all six counts.

The facts of the case show clearly that the government action has been unavoidly conflicting in that the govern-

ment has demanded the validity of petitioner, Ray F. Wilson, judgment for collection while at the same time asserting an invalidity for appeal purposes.

Petitioner Ray F. Wilson's case was remanded to the trial court in which petitioner's punishment on count one was enhanced by giving said petitioner a five year probated sentence, Resentencing Transcript p. 8, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners' conduct prior to and subsequent to said tax case has been satisfactory and the trial court judge has pronounced from the bench, transcript pp. 1008 and 1009 that: "There will be no probationary sentence".

Reasons For Granting The Writ

1. There is a conflict between the decision of the court below in the instant case and the 7th Circuit cases of U. S. v. Dickerson, 413 F.2d 1111 (1969) and U. S. v. Lackey, 413 F.2d 655 (1969). The 7th Circuit has determined that the Miranda Warning is applicable, whereas the 5th Circuit in U. S. v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (1970) has determined that the warning is not applicable and hence has refused to reverse the trial court's denial of petitioners' motion to suppress the evidence of the special agents' seizure.

The facts in the instant case show that the denial of petitioners' motion for suppression of evidence was based upon their residence in that they lived outside of the 7th or 4th judicial district rather than within said district. Such denial give rise to the additional denial to petitioners of their presumable constitutional right of residency anywhere in the United States under equal protection of the law afforded them by the constitution of the United States.

2. In U. S. v. Heffner, 420 F.2d 809 (1970), case similar to appellants, the 4th Circuit held that appellant should have retroactive protection under the administrative ruling "IRS New Release No. 897, October 3, 1967", reprinted in 7 CCH 1967 Stand. Tax Rep., Section 6832,

requiring a warning for protecting the constitutional rights of persons suspected of criminal tax fraud, during all phases of its investigation.

3. Under the statutory provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1654, petitioner Ray F. Wilson has a right to personally plead and conduct his case in any court, where filed, of the United States. This statutory provision coupled with Amendment 6 of the U. S. constitution which gives petitioner in a criminal case a right to personally confront witnesses against him should give a petitioner who acts in good faith an absolute right to self representation. Yet, in the instant case petitioner was prevented from representing himself personally while at the same time the government was increasing the severity of the charges against the petitioner.

4. Petitioner Ray F. Wilson's case was remanded by the 5th Circuit based on the government's belated claim of invalidity of the judgment; yet, the government asserted the validity of the judgment for collection purposes. The simultaneous claim of validity and invalidity upon the same judgment by the government denies petitioners due process and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of petitioners' Amendment 5 and 8 rights under the U. S. constitution.

When the government asserted the validity of petitioners' judgment for collection, such acts by waiver, ratification and estoppel should give rise to an implied warranty of validity of the judgment by the government. To hold otherwise would cast upon the government an unjustified favored position, such that, the government could do no wrong, notwithstanding its acts.

5. Upon remand of petitioner Ray F. Wilson's case to the district court for resentencing, the trial judge increased the severity of his punishment which gives rise to a case in conflict with the holdings in the cases of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 and U. S. v. Lopez, 428 F.2d 1135 (1970).

6. The government was allowed to withhold the identity of its informant without asserting a privilege or basis for such nondisclosure.

7. That petitioners were denied due process as to a fair trial in violation of their amendment 5 rights under the U. S. constitution when the trial judge used grade level obtained in school coupled with 'casual inquiries' having been made upon jurors as a means of excluding jurors from the panel. The qualification process used by the trial judge inherently and systematically excluded all black jurors on these grounds; yet, a white juror (Mr. Abraham) who was an accountant was not excluded because of his specialized education. Moreover, the trial judge placed a previously excluded prospective juror (white) on the panel who fell in the 'casual inquiry' classification. Though petitioners have no right not to have an all white jury, they do have a right to a jury fairly selected.

8. The orderly administration of Criminal Justice requires that this Court review by certiorari the sentencing process exployed by the trial Court and disapproved by the Court of Appeals. In such situation a defendant is surely constitutionally prevented from having a timely review of the merits of his case. Appellant's right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but is one rooted in reality. Dickey v. Florida, 90 S.Ct. 1564. The government's prolonged delay in said trial continued until after the death of one of petitioners' star witnesses, Leon Brown.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERSON L. KING
Counsel for Petitioners

Date: _____

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that service of the above and foregoing instrument has been made upon the United States of America by delivering same to:

United States Adjutant General's
Office
Washington, D.C.

ROBERSON L. KING
Counsel for Petitioners

APPENDIX

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 30340
Summary Calendar*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAY F. WILSON and RUBY J. WILSON,
Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

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(March 30, 1971)

Before GEWIN, GOLDBERG and DYER, Circuit Judges.

DYER, Circuit Judge: Ray F. Wilson and Ruby J. Wilson appeal following conviction and sentence for vio-

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* Rule 18, 5 Cir. See Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, et al., 5 Cir. 1970, 431 F.2d 409, Part I.

lations of 26 U.S.C.A. §7201 and 7206(1).[1] They contend that the District Court erroneously denied their motion to suppress the evidentiary fruits of an allegedly illegal government seizure and interrogation. Moreover, they claim that because the Government failed to prove willfulness, the court erroneously denied their motions for new trial and for acquittal. We dismiss the appeal as to Ray F. Wilson and affirm the trial court's judgment as to Ruby J. Wilson.

After a jury found Ray F. Wilson guilty of six counts of income tax evasion and failure to report income, the District Judge orally imposed sentence from the bench. Subsequently he published a written judgment reiterating his oral pronouncement. On both occasions the judge sentenced Wilson on three counts but imposed no sentence "at this time" on the other three. The Government argues that the judge's action has made Ray Wilson's appeal premature: there has been no final judgment with regard to three counts for which Wilson has been found guilty.

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1. Section 7201 provides:

> Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

Section 7206 provides in pertinent part:

> Any person who—
>
> (1) . . . Willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement, or other document, which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter . . .
>
> shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.

In criminal cases the sentence is the "final judgment" for which appeals may be taken. *Parr v. United States,* 1956, 351 U.S. 513, 518; *Berman v. United States,* 1937, 302 U.S. 211, 212; *Yeloushan v. United States,* 5 Cir. 1963, 313 F.2d 303, 304, *cert. denied,* 373 U.S. 912; *see Corey v. United States,* 1963, 375 U.S. 169, 172; *United States v. Hark,* 1944, 320 U.S. 531, 534. Only probation comporting with 18 U.S.C.A. §3651 obviates the necessity for imposition or execution of sentence to create a final decree in criminal proceedings. *See, e.g., Andrews v. United States,* 1963, 373 U.S. 334, 340. Cognizant of the problems of piecemeal litigation, the Supreme Court has often emphasized the prerequisite of finality for appeal. *See id.* at 340. Furthermore, when a multi-court indictment and verdict is involved, it is essential for post-conviction review that the record disclose the precise sentence for each count. *White v. United States,* 5 Cir. 1968, 396 F.2d 822, 826. This Court has strongly expressed its disapproval of general sentences in such instances. *E.g., Putt v. United States,* 5 Cir. 1968, 392 F.2d 64, 67, *cert. denied,* 393 U.S. 929; *Benson v. United States,* 5 Cir. 1964, 332 F.2d 288, 292; *see Stonecipher v. United States,* 5 Cir. 1969, 409 F.2d 745, 746.

In light of these authorities, it becomes clear that Ray Wilson has not received a final judgment entitling him to appellate review. *See Carroll v. United States,* 1957, 354 U.S. 394, 412; 28 U.S.C.A. §1291. By no stretch of the imagination can a sentence, or fine, imposed on three counts of a six-count conviction be equated with a sentence imposed on all six counts. Nor can the trial judge's decision to withhold sentence on three counts be categorized as probation. Finally, the specific language of the District Court's judgment pretermits our consideration of

the sentence as "general." Consequently, we dismiss Ray F. Wilson's appeal and remand this cause to the District Court for resentencing on all six counts. *See White v. United States, supra* at 825-26.

Ruby J. Wilson, however, has satified the requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291, for the District Judge imposed specific fines on all six counts for which she was convicted. Having considered the record and the District Court's careful findings of fact and conclusions of law, we conclude that Mrs. Wilson's motion to suppress was properly denied. *United States v. Prudden,* 5 Cir. 1970, 424 F.2d 1021, *cert. denied,* 400 U.S. 831; *see United States v. Tonahill,* 5 Cir. 1970, 430 F.2d 1042, 1044-45; *Marcus v. United States,* 5 Cir. 1970, 422 F.2d 752, 756. Furthermore, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the court committed no error in denying her motions for new trial and for acquittal on the ground that the Government had failed to prove willfulness. *See United States v. Jernigan,* 5 Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 471, 473, *cert. denied,* 396 U.S. 927; *Graves v. United States,* 10 Cir. 1951, 191 F.2d 579, 582; *cf. Marcus v. United States, supra* at 755. *See also United States v. Kolsky,* 5 Cir. 1970, 423 F.2d 1111, 1113; *United States v. Robertson,* 5 Cir. 1969, 417 F.2d 873, 875-76; *Hale v. United States,* 5 Cir. 1969, 410 F.2d 147, 149, *cert. denied,* 396 U.S. 902.

The judgment as to Ruby J. Wilson is Affirmed. The appeal of Ray F. Wilson is Dismissed.

United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT

Edward W. Wadsworth
Clerk

Room 408-400 Royal St.
New Orleans, La. 70130
(504) 527-6514

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

April 22, 1971

TO ALL PARTIES LISTED BELOW

Re: No. 30340—U.S.A. vs. Wilson and Wilson

Gentleman:

You are hereby advised that the Court has today entered an order denying the Petition ( ) for Rehearing in the above case. No opinion was rendered in connection therewith. See Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for issuance and stay of the mandate.

Very truly yours,

EDWARD W. WADSWORTH,
Clerk

By FRANCES WOLFF
Deputy Clerk

cc: Mr. Roberson L. King
Mr. Ray F. Wilson
United States Attorney

Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
SEP 23 1971
E. ROBERT SEAVER, CLERK

No. 71-210

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

RAY F. WILSON AND RUBY J. WILSON, PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General,
Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C. 20530.

In the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1971

No. 71-210

RAY F. WILSON AND RUBY J. WILSON, PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

Petitioners were convicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on three counts of wilfully attempting to evade income taxes and three counts of wilfully making and subscribing false returns, in violation of Sections 7201 and 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. The district judge sentenced Mrs. Wilson to $500 fines on each count; he sentenced Mr. Wilson to $10,000 fines on each of three counts, but imposed no sentence "at this time" on the other three counts (Pet. App. 12). The court of appeals affirmed as to Mrs. Wilson, and dismissed Mr. Wilson's appeal on the ground that there was not a "final judgment"

against him, since he had not been sentenced on three counts, and remanded to the district court for resentencing on all six counts (Pet. App. 11–14). The district judge then resentenced Mr. Wilson as follows: sentence suspended and five years' probation on count 1, and fines of $5,000 on each of the five other counts. Mr. Wilson has appealed to the court of appeals from that sentence.

The court of appeals' judgment was entered on March 30, 1971 (Pet. App. 11), and a petition for rehearing was denied on April 22, 1971 (Pet. App. 15). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on August 10, 1971, and is substantially out of time under Rule 22(2) of the Revised Rules of this Court. In any event, petitioners' contentions are without merit and do not warrant further review.

1. With respect to Mr. Wilson, the petition is premature. Pursuant to the court of appeals' mandate, the district judge has resentenced Mr. Wilson on all six counts. The court of appeals did not pass upon the merits of his claims in the earlier appeal which it dismissed. The legal issues raised in the petition, including Mr. Wilson's claim that the district judge erred in resentencing him (Pet. 7, 8), can be fully litigated by him in the pending appeal from the new sentence.

2. The complaint (Pet. 6) that the court of appeals erred in holding that the warnings prescribed in *Miranda* v. *Arizona*, 384 U.S. 436, need not be given in a non-custodial setting during a criminal tax investigation is not well grounded. Though the court of

appeals in the Seventh Circuit has taken a different approach, *United States* v. *Dickerson*, 413 F. 2d 1111, the decision here does not conflict with the rule in any other circuit. *E.g.*, *United States* v. *O'Connor*, 433 F. 2d 752 (C.A. 1), certiorari denied, 401 U.S. 911; *United States* v. *White*, 417 F. 2d 89 (C.A. 2), certiorari denied, 397 U.S. 912; *United States* v. *Jaskiewicz*, 433 F. 2d 415 (C.A. 3), certiorari denied, 400 U.S. 1021; *United States* v. *Mancuso*, 378 F. 2d 612 (C.A. 4), certiorari denied, 390 U.S. 955; *Agoranos* v. *United States*, 409 F. 2d 363 (C.A. 5), certiorari denied, 396 U.S. 824; *United States* v. *Miriani*, 422 F. 2d 150 (C.A. 6), certiorari denied, 399 U.S. 910; *Cohen* v. *United States*, 405 F. 2d 34 (C.A. 8), certiorari denied, 394 U.S. 943; *Simon* v. *United States*, 421 F. 2d 667 (C.A. 9), certiorari denied, 398 U.S. 904.[1]

Although *Dickerson* held that a taxpayer must be given *Miranda* warnings "at the inception of the first contact with the taxpayer after the case has been transferred to the Intelligence Division," that rule was made applicable only to "interrogations taking place after the date of this decision," July 28, 1969 (413 F. 2d at 1117). Since the interviews here occurred long before the *Dickerson* decision, the rule there announced would not be applicable in any event.

[1] The present position in the Tenth Circuit is now somewhat uncertain. In *Hensley* v. *United States*, 406 F. 2d 481 (C.A. 10), the court held in accord with the prevailing view that warnings need not be given in this setting. In *United States* v. *Lockyer*, C.A. 10, No. 71-1083, decided September 16, 1971, slip op. at 18, a panel indicated that *Dickerson* was representative of the "better reasoned cases", but did not discuss *Hensley*.

Moreover, in view of the present policy of the Service to give the substance of the *Miranda* warnings to all taxpayers when they are first interviewed by a special agent,[2] there should be few, if any, future cases that would be treated differently in the Seventh Circuit than in any other circuit.

3. Nor is there merit in the other contentions made in the petition. The reliance (Pet. 6–7) on the directive issued to Treasury special agents in October 1967, requiring warnings of constitutional rights, is misplaced, since the interviews here took place substantially before that date. *United States* v. *Heffner*, 420 F. 2d 809 (C.A. 4), which petitioners cite, is not in point; that decision turns on the fact that the interviews in question occurred *after* the directive (420 F. 2d at 813). Mr. Wilson was not improperly deprived of the right to represent himself (Pet. 7). On the contrary, the trial court recognized that right, and merely urged but did not force Mr. Wilson to retain an attorney. There is nothing in the record supporting the allegations that "the government asserted the validity of the judgment for collection purposes" while claiming that it was not "final" for purposes of

[2] By news release dated November 26, 1968, the Internal Revenue Service announced that henceforth a special agent on his first visit to a taxpayer must warn him of his constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, but not including the proffer of legal aid unless the taxpayer is in custody. The news release notes that this "new procedure goes beyond most legal requirements that are designed to advise persons of their rights." 1968 CCH Fed. Tax Reporter, par. 6946; 1968 Prentice-Hall Fed. Taxes, par. 55,476.

Mr. Wilson's initial appeal (Pet. 7); that the government improperly withheld the identity of an informant (Pet. 8; see *Roviaro* v. *United States*, 353 U.S. 53, 59); or that there were improprieties in the selection of the petit jury panel (Pet. 8).

It is therefore respectfully submitted that the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

ERWIN N. GRISWOLD,
Solicitor General.

SEPTEMBER 1971.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971